Suchergebnisse
Suchergebnisse:
1. Jan. 2012 · Abstract. The notion of the a priori is an important legacy of Kant for modern philosophy of science. In the course of the 20 th century, a variety of proposals was put forward all of which claimed to overcome the inadequacies of Kant’s original proposal of a synthetic a priori for modern science.
Originally published in 1966, this pivotal work of Mikel Dufrenne revises Kant's notion of a priori, a concept previously given insufficient attention by philosophers, to realize a rich understanding that finally does justice to one of Kant's most troubling cruxes.
12. Jan. 2015 · In conclusion, Kant’s idea of synthetic a priori is hugely significant for his philosophy as a whole. It provides the essential bridge between rationalist and empiricist epistemology and in doing so gives probably the best account for the plausibility of metaphysical knowledge that sceptics like Hume had repudiated.
The Notion of the A Priori (Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology & Existential Philosophy) [Dufrenne, Mikel] on Amazon.com. *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers.
- Mikel Dufrenne
Originally published in 1966, this pivotal work of Mikel Dufrenne revises Kant s notion of "a priori, " a concept previously given insufficient attention by philosophers, to realize a rich understanding that finally does justice to one of Kant s most troubling cruxes. Following the Husserlian analytics of phenomenology, Dufrenne postulates a dualistic conception of the "a priori" as a ...
9. Okt. 2007 · One thing that Kripke has managed to convince most people about is that ‘a priori’ is an epistemic notion and ‘necessity’ is a metaphysical notion. Consequently, the connection between a priori knowledge and modality has been deemed to fail. Here I have tried to re-establish that connection in terms of possibility.
The notion of a priori knowledge should thus be explained independently of a literal construal of self-evidence. Other construals of self-evidence will contribute here only if they elucidate a notion of non-empirical warrant that differs from notions of necessary truth, analyticity and certainty as epistemic indubitability.
