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Dworkin argues that law is a matter of rights and principles, not of utility or positivism. He explores how judges should decide novel cases, when citizens can disobey the law, and what makes a theory of law philosophically adequate.
Taking Rights Seriously is a 1977 book about the philosophy of law by the philosopher Ronald Dworkin. In the book, Dworkin argues against the dominant philosophy of Anglo-American legal positivism as presented by H. L. A. Hart in The Concept of Law (1961) and utilitarianism by proposing that rights of the individual against the state ...
- Ronald M. Dworkin
- 1977
31. Jan. 2022 · Taking rights seriously. by. Dworkin, Ronald. Publication date. 1977. Topics. Law -- Philosophy, Jurisprudence, Political rights, Legal positivism, Law -- United States, Jurisprudence [MESH], Droit -- Philosophie, Droits politiques, Positivisme juridique, Droit -- États-Unis, Law, Rechtstheorie, Rechtsfilosofie, United States, Law ...
10. Dez. 2015 · A chapter from an edited volume that reviews Dworkin's theory of law and politics, based on a right to equality and due process. It examines his critique of legal positivism, his view of judicial review and civil disobedience, and his idiosyncratic approach to democracy.
To take rights seriously is less to get rights right, than to show that the rights of all are given due consideration by conducting legal and political debate in an equitable way. As he famously put it, the “‘right to equality’ is not ‘a right to equal treatment’ but a ‘right to treatment as an equal,’” a right “not to an ...
- Richard Bellamy
- 2015
21. Okt. 2013 · A landmark work of political and legal philosophy, Ronald Dworkin's Taking Rights Seriously was acclaimed as a major work on its first publication in 1977 and remains profoundly...
8. Aug. 2019 · Though he sees rights-based judicial review as legitimately trumping utilitarian democratic decisions, his account of legal deliberation is in its way democratic, as his view of civil disobedience illustrates, and could apply as much — if not more — to legislatures as to courts.
