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  1. What distinguishes the Kantian form of constructivism is essentially this: it specifies a particular conception of the person as an element in a reasonable procedure of construction, the outcome of which determines the content of the first principles of justice.

  2. 19. Okt. 2016 · The general case against Kantian constructivism as a theory of normativity largely depends on the special case of moral obligations. The standard objection is that constructivism grounds moral obligation on the value of humanity, hence tacitly committing to moral realism.

    • Carla Bagnoli
    • carla.bagnoli@gmail.com
    • 2016
  3. 27. Sept. 2011 · The term ‘constructivism’ entered debates in moral theory with John Rawls’ seminal Dewey Lectures “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory” (Rawls 1980), wherein Rawls offered a reinterpretation of the philosopher Immanuel Kant’s ethics and of its relevance for political debates.

  4. 29. Nov. 2017 · In his 1980 Dewey Lectures, titled “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,” Rawls portrayed himself – justifiably – as the first to develop what he calls Kantian constructivism as an important moral theory on par with (and, according to Rawls, in fact superior to) intuitionism and utilitarianism.

    • Michael Rohlf
    • rohlf@cua.edu
    • 2017
  5. Abstract John Rawls's account of Kantian constructivism is perhaps his most striking contribution to ethics. In this paper, I examine the relation between Rawls's constructivism and its foundation in …

  6. The general case against Kantian constructivism as a theory of normativity largely depends on the special case of moral obligations. The standard objection is that constructivism grounds moral obligation on the value of humanity, hence tacitly committing to moral realism.

  7. 25. Aug. 2013 · Constructivists have adopted the Kantian motif of self-legislation in arguing that normativity should be understood in terms of rational agency. 1 The most militant constructivists claim that all normative authority in practical reasoning is ultimately self-legislated.