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  1. 19. Juni 2019 · The notion of the a priori. by. Dufrenne, Mikel. Publication date. 1966. Topics. Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 -- Knowledge, Theory of, Experience. Publisher. [Evanston, Ill.] Northwestern University Press.

  2. The notion of the a priori by Dufrenne, Mikel. Publication date 1966 Topics Empiricism, Philosophie, Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 -- Contributions in theory of knowledge, Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804, Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 -- Et l'a priori, Expérience, Exp ...

  3. 26. Feb. 2009 · The Notion of the A Priori. Originally published in 1966, this pivotal work of Mikel Dufrenne revises Kant’s notion of a priori, a concept previously given insufficient...

  4. 10. Juli 2018 · Roughly, a priori knowledge can be understood as knowledge acquired in a way that is suitably independent of the thinker’s experience. But even if we assume that there is a priori knowledge, and that the notion of the a priori is in good standing, a pressing question remains about its possibility. What is peculiar about the ...

    • Célia Teixeira
    • celia.teixeira@gmail.com
    • 2019
  5. 9. Dez. 2007 · 1. Examples that illustrate the difference between a priori and a posteriori (empirical) justification. 2. What sorts of propositions can be a priori justified and known: all, and only, modal propositions? 3. Is a priori justification fallible and defeasible? 4. What is the nature of a priori justification?

  6. 26. Feb. 2009 · The Notion of the A Priori (Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy): Dufrenne, Mikel, Casey, Edward S., Ricoeur, Paul, Casey, Edward S., Casey, Edward S.: 9780810125438: Amazon.com: Books. Books. ›. Politics & Social Sciences. ›. Philosophy. $24.95. Other Used, New, Collectible from $4.26. Buy new: $2495.

    • Mikel Dufrenne
  7. 9. Dez. 2007 · A priori justification is a type of epistemic justification that is, in some sense, independent of experience. Gettier examples have led most philosophers to think that having a justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge ( see sec. 5, below, and the example, Sheep ), but many still believe that it is necessary.