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Philosophy of mind. Ethics. Political philosophy. Susan Lynn Hurley (September 16, 1954 – August 16, 2007) was an American philosopher. She was appointed professor in the department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick in 1994, professor of philosophy at Bristol University from 2006 and the first woman ...
In der englischsprachigen Debatte zählen Andy Clark, Susan Hurley, Richard Menary, Mark Rowlands, Michael Wheeler, Robert A. Wilson und Alva Noë zu den Hauptvertretern des erweiterten Geistes, aber auch David Chalmers äußert sich im Vorwort zu Clarks Buch Supersizing the Mind (2008) der These positiv gegenüber.
Photo by Steve Pyke. Susan Hurley ’76 went on to become a philosopher of great distinction before passing away in 2007 at the age of just 52. Gil Harman, her senior thesis advisor, remembers her as a brilliant student who he thought he could serve best by not getting in her way.
Cognitive Psychology. Collection: Oxford Scholarship Online. Susan Hurley, who has died aged 52 from breast cancer, was professor of philosophy at Bristol University from 2006 and the first woman Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford. She was fascinated by the human condition, in particular by that peculiar condition of being both a locus of ...
Harvard University Press. Philosophy. In this important book, Susan Hurley sheds new light on consciousness by examining its relationships to action from various angles. She assesses the role of agency in the unity of a conscious perspective, and argues that perception and action are more dee...
In this important book, Susan Hurley sheds new light on consciousness by examining its relationships to action from various angles. She assesses the role of agency in the unity of a conscious perspective, and argues that perception and action are more deeply interdependent than we usually assume.
7. Jan. 2003 · Susan Hurley. First published: 07 January 2003. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8349.00078. Citations: 1. PDF. Tools. Share. Abstract. I argue that the aim to neutralize the influence of luck on distribution cannot provide a basis for egalitarianism: it can neither specify nor justify an egalitarian distribution.
