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  1. In our example, accordingly, the reference of the expressions 'the point of intersection of a and b' and 'the point of intersection of b and c' would be the same, but not their senses. The reference of 'evening star' would be the same as that of 'morning star,' but not the sense.

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  2. The reference of a sentence is its truth value, whereas its sense is the thought that it expresses. Frege justified the distinction in a number of ways. Sense is something possessed by a name, whether or not it has a reference.

  3. The ‘reference’ of an expression is the entity the expression designates or applies to. The ‘sense’ of an expression is the way in which the expression presents that reference. For example, the ancients used ‘the morning star’ and ‘the evening star’ to designate what turned out to be the same heavenly body, the planet Venus.

  4. 14. Sept. 1995 · Frege’s seminal paper in the philosophy of language is ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’ (‘On Sense and Reference’, 1892a). In this paper, Frege considered two puzzles about language and noticed, in each case, that one cannot account for the meaningfulness or logical behavior of certain sentences simply on the basis of the ...

  5. Gottlob Frege, ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’, Zeitung für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, 100 (1892), pp. 25–50; translated (for example) as ‘On Sense and Meaning’ in G. Frege, Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy, ed. B. McGuinness (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984); this paper appears in many anthologies in various translations.

    • Michael Morris
    • 2006
  6. (1) is a tautology (assuming the person who says it is truthful) – obviously, any object is equal to itself! (2), on the other hand, is an informative statement. Examples: (3) the sun that rises every day is the same object. (4) comet streaking across the sky may be the same one as 20 years ago.

  7. This chapter analyzes Frege's theory of sense and reference. There is in a sense a “backward road” from references to senses. For everyone who specifies a reference must do so in some way. Then, by her awareness of how she has specified the reference, she is aware of the way the reference is fixed, and hence is aware of the sense.