Suchergebnisse
Suchergebnisse:
The reference and sense of a sign are to be distinguished from the. [p25] associated idea. If the reference of a sign is an object perceivable by the senses, my idea of it is an internal image, [5] arising from memories of sense impressions which I have had and acts, both internal and external, which I have performed.
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1 that one wishes to talk about the words themselves or their sense. This happens, for instance, when the words of an-other are quoted. One’s own words then first designate words of the other speaker, and only the latter have their usual reference. We then have signs of signs.
5. Jan. 2015 · On Sense And Reference. by. Gottlob Frege. Publication date. 1892. Usage. Attribution-No Derivative Works 3.0. Topics. Analytic Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Gottlob Frege.
13. Okt. 2023 · The reference and sense of a sign are to be distinguished from the associated idea. If the reference of a sign is an object perceivable by the senses, my idea of it is an internal image, [3] arising from memories of sense impressions which I have had and acts, both internal and external, which I have performed.
So the indirect Reference of a word is its ordinary Sense. One should always keep an eye on such exceptions, if one is to understand correctly the way in which sign, Sense and Reference are associated. [[29]]The Reference and Sense of a sign is to be distinguished from the idea [Vorstellung] associated with it.
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10. Apr. 2021 · This paper lays out a framework to distinguish sense and denotation of proofs and gives an account to distinguish a mere syntactic divergence from a divergence in meaning and a divergence of proof objects analogous to Frege’s distinction for singular terms and sentences.
Frege on sense and reference 1. Frege on the thesis that meanings are mental Frege’s argumentagainstthe thesis thatthe meanings oflinguistic expressions (i.e., ‘thoughts’) are mental: “If every thought requires an owner and belongs to the contents of his conscious-ness, then the thought has this owner alone; and there is no science common
