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The reference (or "referent"; Bedeutung) of a proper name is the object it means or indicates ( bedeuten ), whereas its sense ( Sinn) is what the name expresses. The reference of a sentence is its truth value, whereas its sense is the thought that it expresses. [1] Frege justified the distinction in a number of ways.
14. Sept. 1995 · In the years 1891–1892, Frege gave more thought to the philosophy of language that would help ground his philosophy of mathematics. He published three of his most well-known papers, ‘Function and Concept’ (1891), ‘On Sense and Reference’ (1892a), and ‘On Concept and Object’ (1892b) in this period.
It is part of a general theory of meaning that postulates an intermediate level of sense between linguistic terms and the entities the terms stand for. Senses give significance to expressions, which in and of themselves are just noises or marks on a surface, and connect them to the world.
28. Sept. 2010 · Summary. Frege's distinction between sense ( Sinn) and reference ( Bedeutung) has been his most influential contribution to philosophy, however central it was to his own projects, and however he may have conceived its importance.
- Michael Kremer
- 2010
5. Juni 2012 · The term ‘reference’, as we shall define it below, has to do with the relationship which holds between an expression and what that expression stands for on particular occasions of its utterance. Type. Chapter. Information. Semantics , pp. 174 - 229. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139165693.009. Publisher: Cambridge University Press.
- John Lyons
- 1977
On sense and reference. GOTTLOB FREGE. [As reprinted in A.W. Moore (ed.) Meaning and Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press.] Equality [1] gives rise to challenging questions which are not altogether easy to answer. Is it a relation? A relation between objects, or between names or signs of objects?
Philosophy of Science Metaphysics. Collection: Oxford Scholarship Online. 1 Sense versus Reference. A number of recent philosophers argue that the ‘paradox of meaning variance’ arises only when insufficient attention gets paid to the distinction between sense and reference. This distinction was first made properly clear by Frege.
