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Social choice theory is the study of theoretical and practical methods to aggregate or combine individual preferences into a collective social welfare function. The field generally assumes that individuals have preferences, and it follows that they can be modeled using utility functions, by the VNM theorem.
18. Dez. 2013 · Formally, a social choice rule, \(f\), is a function that assigns to each profile \(\langle R_1, R_2 , \ldots ,R_n\rangle\) (in some domain of admissible profiles) a social choice set \(f(R_1, R_2 , \ldots ,R_n) \subseteq X\). A social choice rule \(f\) can be derived from a preference aggregation rule \(F\), by defining \(f(R_1, R_2 ...
Social Choice Function: Strong Monotonicity A social choice function C isstrongly monotonic, if for any preference pro le [˜] withC[˜] = a, then for any other preference pro le [˜0] with the property that 8i 2N;8a02A;a ˜0 ia 0if a ˜a0; it must be that C[˜0] = a. Strong monotonicity means that if I The current winner is a
7. Jan. 2019 · pp 1–19. Cite this living reference work entry. Salvador Barberà. 97 Accesses. Download reference work entry PDF. Keywords. Aggregation rules. Voting methods. Social choice functions. Impossibility theorems. Arrow’s impossibility theorem. Chaos theorems. Characterizations. Strategy-proofness. Single peakedness. Liberalism. Glossary.
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A social choice function assigns to every vector of preference relations of all individuals in the group a single alternative, interpreted as the alternative that is most preferred by the group. A social choice function is said to be nonmanipulable if no individual can manipulate the group's choice and obtain a better outcome by reporting a ...
21. Jan. 2023 · A social choice function describes a socially desirable outcome for each possible state.
This paper offers a short introduction to some of the fundamental results of social choice theory. Topices include: Nash implementability and the Muller-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem, anonymous and neutral social choice correspondences, two-party competition in tournaments, binary agendas and the top cycle, and median voter theorems.
