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Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis is a book on matching markets in economics and game theory, particularly concentrating on the stable marriage problem. It was written by Alvin E. Roth and Marilda Sotomayor, with a preface by Robert Aumann, [1] [2] and published in 1990 by the Cambridge University ...
- Alvin E. Roth, Marilda A. Oliveira Sotomayor
- 1990
These models are called two‐sided matchingmodels. They are suitable for modeling a great variety of labor markets of firms and workers,markets of buyers and sellers, markets of students and schools, etc. They are grouped into threecategories: the discrete, the continuous and the hybrid matching models.
Two-sided matching provides a model of search processes such as those between firms and workers in labor markets or between buyers and sellers in auctions. This book gives a comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching.
- Alvin E. Roth, Marilda A. Oliveira Sotomayor
- 1990
1. Feb. 2023 · Two-sided matching is how to obtain appropriate matching results according to the preference information provided by the matching subjects in two disjoint finite sets (Roth, 1985). The theory of two-sided matching dates back to 1962, Gale and Shapley (1962) made pioneering studies on the definition of marriage matching, the existence ...
21. Aug. 2020 · In the discrete two-sided matching models, agents have preferences over allowable sets of partners. The allowable sets of partners for f of the type { w, f ,…, f } are identified with the individual agent w ∈ W and the allowable set of partners { f … f } is identified with f.
5. Jan. 2013 · The term “two-sided” refers to the fact that agents in such markets belong, from the outset, to one of two disjoint sets - for example, firms or workers. This contrasts with commodity markets, in which the market price may determine whether an agent is a buyer or a seller.
1. Sept. 2017 · Most of the two-sided matching literature maintains the assumption that agents are never indifferent between any two members of the opposite side. In practice, however, ties in preferences arise naturally and are widespread.
