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  1. On sense and reference. GOTTLOB FREGE. [As reprinted in A.W. Moore (ed.) Meaning and Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press.] Equality [1] gives rise to challenging questions which are not altogether easy to answer. Is it a relation? A relation between objects, or between names or signs of objects?

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  2. In the philosophy of language, the distinction between sense and reference was an idea of the German philosopher and mathematician Gottlob Frege in 1892 (in his paper "On Sense and Reference"; German: "Über Sinn und Bedeutung"), reflecting the two ways he believed a singular term may have meaning.

  3. 13. Okt. 2023 · The regular connexion between a sign, its sense, and its reference is of such a kind that to the sign there corresponds a definite sense and to that in turn a definite reference, while to a given reference (an object) there does not belong only a single sign.

  4. 5. Jan. 2015 · On Sense And Reference. by. Gottlob Frege. Publication date. 1892. Usage. Attribution-No Derivative Works 3.0. Topics. Analytic Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Gottlob Frege.

  5. 29 The referent and sense of a sign are to be distinguished from the associated conception. If the referent of a sign is an object perceivable by the senses, my conception of it is an internal image, arising from memories of sense impressions which I have had and activities, both internal and external, which I have performed. Such a conception

  6. 14. Sept. 1995 · Frege’s seminal paper in the philosophy of language is ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’ (‘On Sense and Reference’, 1892a). In this paper, Frege considered two puzzles about language and noticed, in each case, that one cannot account for the meaningfulness or logical behavior of certain sentences simply on the basis of the denotations of the ...

  7. As influential as Frege's distinction between sense and reference has been in shaping nearly all contemporary work in the philosophy of language - as well as considerable portions of the philosophy of mind - many of its most prominent critics and proponents alike have, it seems to me, failed adequately to understand it.